Top Photo: USS Langley (CVL-27) rolling sharply during extreme weather conditions in the Pacific, likely Typhoon Cobra,  December 14–19 1944.  US Naval History and Heritage Command (80-G-305484)

For millennia, fishermen, merchant sailors, and other mariners have both feared and braved the violent seas. Typhoons, hurricanes, or nor’easters have all claimed both ships and crews, with Mother Nature remaining a constant companion for those at sea. Her wrath applies equally to military flotillas and invasion fleets. Perhaps the most notable military losses at sea due to weather occurred during Kubli Khan’s invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281. Aimed at the Japanese island of Kyushu, both Mongol invasions were thwarted by typhoons that decimated the Khan’s fleet. These 13th-century events provided a new chapter in Yamato lore and gave rise to the concept of the kamikaze, or a divine wind saving the island nation. However, that was not the last time a typhoon wreaked havoc on a military flotilla. During World War II, with Japan on the strategic defensive and her combat power waning, another fleet moving against the island nation also felt the wrath of Mother Nature.

On December 18, 1944, Typhoon “Cobra” struck an American flotilla supporting General Douglas MacArthur’s invasion of the Philippines. Task Force (TF) 38, under the command of Admiral William Halsey, included seven Essex-class carriers, six light carriers, eight battleships, four heavy and 11 light cruisers, along with approximately 50 destroyers. Conducting combat operations in and around Leyte during the late fall as part of MacArthur’s return to the Philippines, many of Halsey’s vessels were running low on fuel and supplies. Planning to support future combat operations in and around the Philippine archipelago, TF 38 set sail for a replenishment rendezvous point 400 miles due east to meet with fleet oilers and associated support vessels. The planned rendezvous location allowed TF 38’s vessels to remain close to the area of operations but safely outside the range of ground based Japanese aircraft. Replenishing TF 38 was a refueling group from the US Third Fleet designated Task Group 30.8 (TG 30.8). This logistical flotilla under Captain Jasper T. Acuff consisted of oilers, fleet tugs, destroyers, and escort carriers laden with replacement airframes.

Admiral William Halsey (center) aboard his flagship USS New Jersey in December 1944 just before his encounter with Typhoon Cobra. (US Navy History and Heritage Command)

In the mid-20th century, meteorology was indeed a science but did not enjoy the bounty of contemporary satellite imagery, extensive global communications, and computer modeling. Most meteorological data at this time came from weather observation aircraft, surface reports, and ship transmissions. As a result, weather forecasting was a jigsaw puzzle cobbled together from data that was usually a few hours old, dependent upon the quality of the reports received, and included subjective opinions or educated guesses. While naval task forces carried their own “aerologists” (meteorologists), fleets at sea also depended upon forecasting support from Fleet Weather Central located in Hawaii. This centralized activity provided weather support to the US fleet throughout the Pacific and transmitted its reports twice a day.  Given the state of meteorological observation, data gathering, forecasting, and reporting at the time, a small, tightly built typhoon or low-pressure trough could easily be missed in the vastness of the Pacific.

No alarming weather patterns were reported or observed in the days preceding TF 38’s refueling rendezvous scheduled for December 17. The aerologist aboard Halsey’s flagship USS New Jersey (BB 62) forecasted a “disturbance” some 450 miles east moving north-northwest but did not identify any real weather threat. While the initial rendezvous took place in the eastern part of the Philippine Sea, marine conditions complicated the replenishment effort. One sailor aboard USS Astoria (CL 90) observed: “We had a hell of a time getting the lines over, the waves were so high.” As the day progressed, the situation worsened with the destroyer USS Maddox (DD 731) having a fuel line break and almost colliding with the oiler USS Manatee (AO 58). Fuel lines parted with other vessel pairings as underway replenishment becoming an exercise in frustration. In addition to the resupply of fuel, part of the rendezvous included the transfer of new combat aircraft from the escort carrier USS Kwajalein (CVE 98) to the TF 38 carriers. However, this process too was affected by the weather, causing the cancellation of all air operations. Eventually deck crews on the resident carriers switched from launch and recovery operations to lashing and securing aircraft to the ships’ decks. By noon, Admiral Halsey realized the futility of the effort and called off the replenishment. Subsequently he planned for a second rendezvous point that lay northwest and scheduled for the next day at 0600.

Thinking a second rendezvous point might provide clearer weather, the admiral ordered a course change. However, unbeknownst to Halsey and his meteorologists, the violent storm raged only 120 miles to the east of the fleet’s position. The typhoon’s actual location was in stark contrast to a prediction made by Halsey’s own aerologist, who claimed that that a potential storm lay 450 miles further away. Not willing to sail further from planned operations in Mindoro and Lingayen Gulf, Halsey unwittingly kept the fleet in the path of the small unobserved storm.

At TF 30.8, Acuff determined that a storm was heading toward the second rendezvous point, while Fleet Weather Central plotted the depression heading due north. With the information provided by Acuff, Halsey, at 1533 on December 17, designated a third rendezvous point and scheduled it for the next morning. Having his fleet take a heading of 270 degrees, the flotilla soon began to outpace the approaching storm by three to six knots. Sea conditions improved temporarily as they moved away from the storm but remained a challenge. One sailor aboard the escort carrier USS Kwajalein reported: “As each wave rolled under, the entire bow would come out of the water, hover for a few seconds, and then crash taking the flight deck almost to sea level.”

Given the rough sea states and realizing that TF 38 could not make the third rendezvous point by the appointed time given, at around 2200 on December 17 Halsey canceled it and redesignated a fourth one located to the northwest. Seeking help from the wind, at 2300 he ordered TF 38 to change course from due west to south, hoping to find smoother waters. Part of this plan included an eventual course correction to the northwest at 0200 with the ships steaming to the fourth rendezvous point. With this order, the admiral now had his ships on a zig-zag track in front of the storm’s path. Sea conditions precluded the replenishment operation, and at 0803 on December 18, Halsey canceled the fourth rendezvous point and ordered his ships to head due south. During this time, ships of TF 38 began to spread out, with each of them experiencing different barometric pressure readings and varying weather conditions.

That morning the winds grew to between 37 and 43 knots as the barometer fell, but the actual presence of a typhoon remained speculative. However, by 1000, Halsey’s aerologist began to see the pressure fall “very, very, rapidly” along with a shift in the winds indicating that a typhoon was in the area. By noon, one ship’s log reported winds as high as 73 knots. As the storm moved westward, its wall eye passed so close to TF 38’s aircraft carriers that their radar screens reflected the meteorological phenomenon. Given the emerging situation, the admiral directed his vessels to take their most “comfortable courses with wind on the port quarter.” However, by this time many skippers were already adjusting speed and course to ensure their vessels’ safety. With pressure dropping to a low of 27.07, the storm reached its peak strength. At 1345, Halsey issued a typhoon warning and alerted Fleet Weather Central, giving the first official mention of the typhoon. Unknown to him at that time, three vessels had already succumbed to the raging seas.    

Reportedly a radar image of the December 18 typhoon from a TF 38 aircraft carrier, one of the first images to capture such a phenomenon. (US Navy History and Heritage Command/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

Except for the battleships, TF 38 vessels were spread among an area 50 to 60 miles wide and no longer held formation. Skippers caught in the storm’s path fought rolling seas with the separation of sea and sky reportedly disappearing. Visibility dropped to as little as three feet, with winds so fierce that watches were called in and men on carrier decks had to crawl on their bellies to move about. Planes lashed to the deck on some carriers broke free, wrecking other aircraft, or smashed into bulkheads, starting fires and causing other damage.  The escort carrier USS Langley (CVL-27) rolled as much as 70 degrees with USS Kwajalein reaching 39 degrees. Other carriers took on water, resulting in associated damage creating other hazards. In all, 146 TF 38 planes were damaged, blown overboard, or jettisoned from their decks. Compared to some of the smaller destroyers, the carriers had it easy.

The rolling deck of USS Cowpens as it makes its way during Typhoon Cobra. (US Navy History and Heritage Command)

Since many of the destroyers had empty fuel tanks, their ballast was light, complicating handling. Although the fuel tanks could be flooded with sea water to add weight, many skippers delayed that action, hoping for refueling at the various rendezvous points. USS Spence (DD 512) was one such vessel: With her fuel state down to 15 percent, she began water-ballasting, but the action was too late. Waves crashed over her decks, water entered her ventilation shafts and found its way into electrical circuit boards. At 1110, the ship rolled hard to port and eventually succumbed to the storm’s wrath. As the storm’s first victim, only 23 of her crew of 317 survived.

Rolling some 53 degrees, USS Sante Fe (CL 60) struggles while negotiating the December 18 typhoon. (US Navy History and Heritage Command)

Near the same time, USS Hull (DD 350) had her fuel tanks at 70 percent, but with over 500 tons of additional weight topside, she had a high center of gravity. Experiencing winds of 100 knots, she rolled 50 degrees and then 70. Surviving these initial gusts, she was hit with another measuring 110 knots that rolled her so far abeam that water entered her funnel and pilot house, causing her to capsize. Fortunately for Hull’s crew, USS Tabberer (DE 418), also damaged from the storm, found survivors and began a rescue mission after the storm cleared. Despite the efforts of Tabberer, only 62 of the Hull’s 202 crewmembers survived.

Other destroyers such as USS Dewey (DD 349) experienced much of the same. While also top heavy, the crew jettisoned the topside weight, reballasted with sea water, and (fortunately) lost her funnel decreasing her sail area. Luckily, she remained afloat. USS Aylwin (DD 355) also rolled some 70 degrees, staying there for 20 minutes while experiencing severe flooding. However, through skillful ship handling and actions taken by select members of the crew, she too remained afloat. USS Monaghan (DD 354), with fuel tanks at 76 percent, attempted further ballasting, but stuck valves prevented the adding of additional weight. At 1130, she began taking serious rolls and then lost electrical and steering power. She eventually foundered, killing 250 men with only six survivors.

With the storm clearing by the afternoon, Halsey ordered search parties for men washed overboard and directed TF 38 to steer for Ulithi. Not until early the next morning around 0200 on December 19 did the admiral learn about the flotilla’s losses. This was the US Navy’s worst natural disaster in its history. In all, 790 sailors perished as the fleet lost three destroyers along with 146 planes. Furthermore, 27 ships sustained damage, with 11 requiring extensive repairs. A court of inquiry later found Halsey responsible but defended the admiral’s actions. In their findings they reported his actions were “errors in judgement committed under the stress of war operations and stemming from a commendable desire to meet military requirements.” For the vessels lost, the court found that the three skippers waited too long in acting to prevent the foundering of their ships.

As with most tragedies, the event was studied and lessons were garnered. The court recommended procedures to reducing topside flooding and better stability measures on the small destroyers. Improvements to Navy meteorological services were also recommend, including the stationing of weather ships in various areas, increased reporting stations ashore, and establishment of a new central weather facility located at Guam. Most of these measures were implement over the next few months. Despite the loss of life, the sinking of three US vessels, and the damaged caused to dozens more, no 20th-century “divine wind” would save Japan like it had during the 13th century.