Top Photo: Torpedoes aboard the U.S. Navy light aircraft carrier USS Princeton (CVL-23) explode on October 24, 1944, after she was bombed by a Japanese aircraft during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. The light cruiser USS Reno (CL-96) is visible on this side of the Princeton. U.S. Navy National Museum of Naval Aviation No. 1983.046.010.039

In October 1944, General Douglas MacArthur dramatically landed on the island of Leyte in the Philippines. Shortly after, he addressed the Filipino people by radio and announced that he had fulfilled his promise to return as a liberator. 

Yet the battle for the Philippines was far from over. The next dramatic chapter in the Pacific war would take place on the seas, as the Japanese launched a bold plan to smash the American fleet, trap MacArthur, and potentially halt the entire Allied advance.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, as it became known, was the largest naval engagement in history. While it ended in American victory, the result could have been very different.

‘I Have Returned’

Allied success in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea had put the Japanese on the defensive across the Pacific. 

But American commanders disagreed about where the next advance should take place. Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall all initially favored advancing toward the island of Formosa, which they believed could serve as a springboard for an assault on the Japanese home islands.[1]

In contrast, MacArthur advocated for focusing on the Philippines, attacking first the island of Leyte, then Luzon and Mindanao. MacArthur’s argument was both military and moral: the Philippines would be easier to defend than Formosa, he argued, and capturing the islands would sever Japanese sea lines of communication. In addition, the Philippines had been US territory before the war requiring liberation. As historian Adrian Stewart has written, “[MacArthur] argued passionately that he had given his and America’s word that the islands should be liberated as soon as possible,” making the invasion a matter of both national honor and obligation.[2] 

MacArthur’s view prevailed with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and won over both Nimitz and Marshall in the ensuing weeks.[3] The next American objective would indeed be the Philippines. In preparation, US Marines landed on Peleliu in September 1944, encountering fierce resistance but eventually securing the island. 

On October 20, 1944, MacArthur’s troops landed on Leyte and were soon joined by the general himself, who strode ashore through the surf and delivered his famous radio address from the beach. 

Gen. Douglas MacArthur wades ashore during initial landings at Leyte, Philippine Islands. October 20, 1944. U.S. Army Signal Corps officer Gaetano Faillace. National Archives (NAID) 531424

That dramatic moment was made possible by a tremendous fleet. Reporting to MacArthur, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid had more than seven hundred ships under his command in the Seventh Fleet, including transports and minesweepers that facilitated the actual landings. Despite its size, however, the Seventh Fleet was equipped to support the amphibious assault, not to fight a battle   on the high seas—as it would soon be forced to do.

Supporting and protecting the invasion was the Third Fleet under the command of Admiral William “Bull” Halsey Jr., who in turn reported to Nimitz. The Third Fleet included Task Force 38, effectively the bulk of the US Navy’s firepower in the Pacific, composed of 17 aircraft carriers, dozens of destroyer escorts, and six fast battleships.

Importantly, there was no supreme commander appointed to oversee the operation, leaving each fleet effectively separate. According to the US Army’s official history, Halsey’s orders were to “secure air supremacy over the Philippines, protect the landings, and apply unremitting pressure on Japan. If the opportunity to destroy the major portion of the Japanese fleet should arise or could be created, that destruction was to be its primary task.”[4]

This final sentence would carry major consequences and lead to a controversy that persists to the present day.

Sho-1

The American invasion of Leyte did not come as a surprise to the Japanese—it was hardly possible to conceal the Seventh Fleet. The Imperial Japanese navy launched its defensive plan for the Philippines, designated Sho-1, even before MacArthur’s landing on Leyte.

Sho-1 called for a massive naval operation to effectively trap the entire American fleet in a pincer maneuver in Leyte Gulf. Admiral Takeo Kurita would sail his fleet through the Philippines from the east and attack the Seventh Fleet from the north. Kurita’s fleet, which included the formidable battleships Yamato and Nagato, was the main Japanese fighting force. 

Simultaneously with Kurita’s advance, Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura would maneuver and attack from the south, joined by cruisers and destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. They would be supported by land-based aircraft from Luzon. If successful, they would entrap and destroy the Seventh Fleet, trapping MacArthur’s forces on Leyte or ending the invasion before it began.[5]

Finally, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa would take on a unique role. His Northern Force, consisting of four aircraft carriers and escorts, would sail toward Haley’s Third Fleet from the north and then turn away, hoping to lure some or all of the American Third Fleet in pursuit and hence draw them away from protecting Kinkaid’s weaker Seventh Fleet. 

Due to aircraft and pilot shortages, there were few planes or crews actually aboard Ozawa’s carriers. The admiral himself assumed his force would be destroyed in the battle to come, and as Stewart has written, the mission was “wholly one of sacrifice.”[6]

The four engagements of the battle of Leyte Gulf: 1. Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. 2. Battle of Surigao Strait. 3. Battle off Cape Engaño. 4. Battle off Samar. United States Army map.

Halsey’s Decision

Despite the apparent sophistication of the Japanese plan, events almost immediately went awry. On October 23, 1944, two American submarines spotted Kurita’s fleet and attacked, sinking two heavy cruisers including the admiral’s flagship, in the Sibuyan Sea.[7] The Americans now knew the location of the main Japanese fleet.

The battle began in earnest the following day, with the light carrier USS Princeton suffering a bomb hit that sparked a fire and later an explosion. Casualties were compounded by the fact that the cruiser USS Birmingham was pulled alongside Princeton and assisting with firefighting at the moment of the explosion. Despite the loss of Princeton, American ships and aircraft inflicted heavy losses on Kurita’s fleet and the admiral reversed course, giving the illusion that he was retreating west. 

Later that night, the American Seventh Fleet inflicted heavy losses on Nishimura’s fleet in Surigao Strait, killing the admiral himself. Shima’s supporting fleet arrived too late to assist and turned back rather than face the American fleet.[8] Entering the early morning hours of October 25, the main Japanese force appeared repulsed.

Yet at this moment the Japanese decoy plan sprang into action. Ozawa’s carrier fleet, tasked with luring away Halsey, had ironically gone unnoticed by the Americans despite efforts to deliberately give away its position by opening radio communications in violation of usual operational security. 

Around noon on October 24, as Kurita’s fleet was taking heavy losses, Ozawa launched dozens of fighters and dive bombers against the American fleet to attract attention. The planes then flew to airfields on land to avoid destruction on the carriers in the battle to come.[9]

The ruse worked. Late in the afternoon, American reconnaissance planes spotted Ozawa’s apparently menacing fleet to the north. With Kurita seemingly withdrawing, Halsey faced a dilemma: he could divide his forces and leave some number of ships in position if Kurita were to return; he could ignore Ozawa’s fleet entirely; or he could commit his entire force to pursuing Ozawa. 

Halsey chose the third option. Historians have attributed a number of factors to his decision, ranging from the ambiguous orders he had been given, long-simmering frustration over Allied inability to sink Japanese carriers in the past, the mistaken belief that Kurita’s force was in retreat, and a lack of intelligence about the extent of Japanese air losses that rendered carriers less dangerous than they had been earlier in the war.[10] Regardless, Halsey ordered the Third Fleet to sail north. This, in turn, left Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet exposed. A miscommunication between the admirals left both Kinkaid and Nimitz unclear on Halsey’s intentions. 

Unbeknownst to either American commander, Kurita had already reversed course and was returning to the fight. The climactic battle began on the morning of October 25, as Kurita’s fleet smashed into Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet, sinking an escort carrier and several destroyers.[11] American fighters and bombers from three task forces nicknamed Taffy 1, 2, and 3 fought back valiantly against the odds, sinking two Japanese heavy cruisers in return. 

With an apparent victory in his grasp, Kurita inexplicably called off the attack and retired with his fleet. Like Halsey’s decision, Kurita’s action has been the source of much controversy since. Stewart has speculated that Kurita believed Kinkaid’s escort carriers were in fact fleet carriers with large complements of fighters and bombers at the ready. In addition, Stewart observes that Ozawa and Kurita had communication difficulties throughout the battle, and hence Kurita could not have known that Ozawa’s ruse to the north had been successful.[12]

Kurita himself offered few insights even after the war, remarking simply that he believed advancing into Leyte Gulf itself would result in the fleet coming under increasingly heavy air attack.[13] Several of his fellow officers accused him of cowardice.[14] Regardless of the reason, Kurita’s decision to withdraw likely saved Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet from disaster. 

To the north, Halsey’s fleet overtook Ozawa’s diversion force. In the midst of the battle, Halsey began receiving communication from Kinkaid and Nimitz about the plight of the Seventh Fleet. Realizing his error, Halsey now divided his fleet into three task forces, leaving two to finish off Ozawa’s ships while the third sailed back toward Leyte. Halsey’s task forces ultimately sunk all four of Ozawa’s carriers.[15]

As the battle raged on October 25, Taffy 1 encountered a deadly new weapon: the kamikaze. Units of these suicide pilots had been formed months before and now sprang into action, ready to lay down their lives in the service of the emperor. Kamikaze attacks would claim thousands of Allied lives in the remaining months of the war.

Aftermath

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval engagement in history. Yet, ironically, it firmly proved the critical importance of naval air power. Powerful battleships fell prey to aerial attacks while the emergence of the kamikaze presented a dangerous new threat to Allied fleets. As historian Samuel Eliot Morison has written, “The outstanding lesson for the Battle of Leyte Gulf is the utter helplessness of a modern fleet without air support.”[16]

While the Battle of Leyte Gulf was an American victory, it came it a price. The US lost one light carrier (USS Princeton) and two escort carriers, along with two destroyers and a destroyer escort.[17] Thousands of survivors of the sinkings languished in the water for hours before being rescued or perishing.[18]

On the other hand, the damage inflicted on the Japanese fleet was considerable. A total of 26 ships were sunk, including three battleships and four carriers. One of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s most powerful battleships, Musashi, was among the losses. These ships were impossible to replace with Japan’s remaining industrial resources.

Yet the defeat carried a deeper strategic significance as well. As Stewart has written, “The real significance of the Japanese defeat … goes beyond the number of sunken ships—their real loss was the ability to fight another full-scale action.” Its ultimate consequence, he continued, was to become “the death sentence for Japan’s Navy; hence for the country as a whole.”[19]

With the Japanese navy no longer a strategic threat, MacArthur’s invasion of Leyte continued and within months had advanced to the island of Luzon and the capital of Manila. 

Yet the controversies surrounding the battle persist to the present. On the Japanese side, Kurita’s decision to withdraw when the battle appeared to be tending in his favor was roundly criticized at the time. Ozawa reportedly considered suicide after the loss of his carriers but was dissuaded by colleagues who reminded him that by losing his carriers, he had in fact fulfilled his mission—something no other Japanese admiral had been able to do.[20]

Debate over Halsey’s decision to pursue Ozawa’s carrier fleet rather than stay and assist Kinkaid’s fleet began immediately after the battle and persists to this day. Historians have also observed that the lack of an overall supreme commander hindered coordination between the fleets. In a twist of fate, a few months after the battle, Halsey’s Task Force 38 was struck by Typhoon “Cobra,” sinking several destroyers and destroying more than a hundred aircraft in the US Navy’s most costly natural disaster.

Despite the controversies, Leyte Gulf was a critical American victory. The Japanese navy would never recover from the loss, and the door was now open for MacArthur to continue the liberation of the Philippines and, ultimately, for the Americans to push toward Okinawa in preparation for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.